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I.

INTRODUCTION

Most Americans who have ever held a job probably know that the
paycheck they receive does not contain the full amount that they earn for their
work. Instead, their earnings have been reduced to reflect a number of items,
including taxes. The federal government requires an employer to withhold
two types of tax: income tax and employment tax. A worker can frequently
adjust the amounts that get withheld in income tax. These adjustments will
simply affect the size of the refund they receive or the payment they must
make when they file their annual income tax return. However, there is no way
for a worker to adjust the employment taxes that are taken out of their pay.
They are a nonnegotiable obligation that comes with the privilege of earning
a wage.1
The employment tax system does not operate in such a rigid and inflexible
way, however, for individuals who are self-employed. Rather, the system
permits many of them to control how much of their earnings are subject to
tax.2 In tax circles, we call that amount the tax base. And the tax savings can
be quite dramatic for someone who can successfully remove a substantial
amount of their earnings from the employment tax base. Two prominent cases
will illustrate this point.
In 2004, John Edwards was a top contender for the Democratic
nomination for president.3 At the time, he was a U.S. senator from North
Carolina.4 However, before entering public office, he earned millions as a
self-employed trial lawyer with a firm that bore his name.5 In 1997 alone, his
earnings exceeded $26 million, while his tax returns showed that he avoided

1. President Trump’s executive order to defer the payroll tax is intended to introduce some
limited, temporary flexibility. See Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President, to the Sec’y of
the Treasury, Deferring Payroll Tax Obligations in Light of the Ongoing COVID-19 Disaster (Aug.
8, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-13/pdf/2020-17899.pdf. However, the
plan has been derided as unwise and unworkable. William Hoffman, IRS Payroll Tax Deferral
Guidance Sparks Repayment Questions, Tax Notes (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/taxnotes-today-federal/deferral-taxes/irs-payroll-tax-deferral-guidance-sparks-repaymentquestions/2020/08/31/2cx0f.
2. See discussion infra Sections III.B–C.
3. Kelly Wallace & Justin Dial, Edwards Suspends Presidential Campaign, CNN (Mar. 4, 2004,
12:13 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/03/04/elec04.prez.edwards.suspension/
index. html.
4. Id.
5. Mark Koba, How the Gingrich-Edwards Tax Loophole Works, CNBC (Mar. 5, 2014, 11:35
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/03/05/cnbc-explains-the-gingrich-edwards-tax- loophole.html.
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roughly $600,000 in employment tax on his earnings between 1995 and 1999.6
He accomplished this by causing his firm to pay him an annual salary of
$360,000, while receiving the rest of his earnings as a distribution of profits
from the firm.7 In other words, he artificially reduced his tax base by choosing
to underpay himself for the work he did for himself. He still had access to the
rest of the money he earned. He just withdrew it from the firm as a dividend
instead of as a wage, which did not trigger any employment tax.
This is an equal opportunity technique that both Democrats and
Republicans have exploited. During his 2012 campaign to be the Republican
presidential nominee, Newt Gingrich released his tax returns. They showed
that he was the sole owner of two companies, both of which paid him
compensation that was a fraction of what he earned through them for writing
books and giving speeches.8 He paid employment tax on the amounts he
received as compensation.9 However, he avoided $69,000 in tax on the
amounts he received as a dividend.10 Neither Gingrich nor Edwards had to
pay back taxes, but their political images suffered.
These two cases drew enough attention to this tax avoidance maneuver
that it has become known as the Gingrich-Edwards Loophole.11 The
technique is one specific example of the options that self-employed
individuals have to limit what they pay in employment tax. The other options
are variations of the same theme: The taxpayer operates a business through a
company that they own and control, and the company pays a fraction of its
earnings to the taxpayer as compensation for their work while allowing the
taxpayer to access the lion’s share of the profits as a distribution of profits.12
The Gingrich and Edwards cases might be extreme examples where most
fair-minded individuals would agree that the two presidential candidates
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Janet Novack, Gingrich Used Payroll Tax Ploy Often Attacked by IRS, FORBES (Jan. 12,
2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2012/01/22/gingrich-used-payroll-tax-ploy-oftenattacked-by-irs/?sh=7c83968d7b3b (noting the fraction of taxes paid on earnings).
9. See Koba, supra note 5.
10. Id.
11. Some believe there is evidence that Donald Trump and Joe Biden have also exploited the same
loophole. Richard Rubin, Joe Biden Used Tax-Code Loophole Obama Tried to Plug, WALL ST. J.
(July 10, 2019, 1:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/joe-biden-used-tax-code-loophole-obamatried-to-plug-11562779300; Fred T. Goldberg Jr. & Michael J. Graetz, Trump Probably Avoided His
Medicare Taxes, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
11/03/opinion/trump-probably-avoided-his-medicare-taxes-too.html.
12. See discussion infra Sections III.B–D.
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should have been required to include more of their earnings in their
employment tax base. However, it might be more difficult to say how much
should count and how much, if any, should be exempt. For Gingrich and
Edwards, one could imagine a rationale for including all of it. After all, the
earnings derived by their firms were almost entirely a product of their labor.13
Therefore, it would seem to exalt form over substance to pretend that the
amounts they received as a distribution of profits should be excluded from
their employment tax base. Those amounts were earnings from work just as
much as the paycheck an employee receives from an unrelated employer.
In fact, the employment tax statutes are intended to tax earnings from
work.14 Unfortunately, when the individual doing the work is self-employed,
it can be difficult to isolate the earnings derived from the individual’s labor as
opposed to the returns on any capital that the business might require.15
Consider self-employed plumbers. They could not ply their trade unless they
had a vehicle to drive from location to location along with their equipment.
In the absence of a vehicle and other business assets, we would expect their
earnings to be close to zero. So, those assets play an essential role in helping
the business generate profits. The question is, how big of a role?
If the plumber chose to purchase any of the property used in the business,
the cost of the property should offset any revenues generated over the time the
asset is used in the business. Accounting and tax rules already accomplish
this through the technique of depreciation.16 However, depreciation only
allocates the cost of the property over time. It does not reflect the contribution
13. See Koba, supra note 5; Novack, supra note 8.
14. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-6-94, DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS
RELATING TO WORKER CLASSIFICATION AND THE TAX TREATMENT OF CERTAIN S CORPORATION
SHAREHOLDERS AND PARTNERS, at 21 (1994); see also Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass
Slipper—Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax, 54 TAX L. 65, 74 (2000) (citing S. Rep. No. 81–
1669 (1950), which accompanied Social Security Amendments of 1950); Thomas E. Fritz,
Flowthrough Entities and the Self-Employment Tax; Is it Time for a Uniform Standard?, 17 VA. TAX
REV. 811, 820 (1998) (first citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 103D CONG., DESCRIPTION
AND ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII OF H.R. 3600, S. 1775, at 38 (Comm. Print 1993); then citing STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 103D CONG., STAFF DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS ON
WORKER CLASSIFICATION AND TAX TREATMENT OF CERTAIN S CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS AND
PARTNERS).
15. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., PUB. NO. 4168, THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL AND LABOR THROUGH
THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX 12 (Sept. 2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/09-27-SECA.pdf (noting that the majority of taxpayers would likely “not be able
to identify which portion of their self-employment income represents wages and which is a return on
capital investments”).
16. See I.R.C. §§ 167 and 168 (2018).
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that the property played in generating profits. The answer has important
implications if the employment tax rules hope to impose a tax on labor and
nothing else. Every dollar in profits that is attributable to capital investments
reduces the profits that would be attributable to the labor of the owner.17
Unfortunately, existing employment tax statutes make no effort to
differentiate the returns on capital and labor on any principled basis.18 Instead,
the statutes produce largely arbitrary outcomes.19 At one extreme, some
individuals, like Gingrich and Edwards, can limit their tax base to obscenely
low amounts that bear no resemblance to the contribution that their personal
efforts played in producing the income. Taxpayers typically enjoy this
flexibility if they operate through a business entity, like a partnership, limited
liability company, or corporation.20 At the other extreme, individuals who
operate as sole proprietors have no flexibility whatsoever, causing their
employment tax base to include virtually all the profits from their business,
even though their business may require a substantial capital investment.21 So
the employment tax laws simultaneously require some individuals to overstate
their tax base while permitting others to understate theirs.22
What’s more, the inequities favor the wealthy. Income derived from a
business accounts for an increasing share of an individual’s total income as
one moves up the income ladder. A recent analysis based on tax returns from
2017 shows that income from a business accounts for over 25% of the income
of taxpayers whose adjusted gross income (AGI) exceeds $1 million.23 For
those whose AGI falls between $200,000 and $1 million, business income
accounts for roughly 15% of the total.24 By comparison, for all other

17. The analysis would be different if the plumber leased the property used in the business. In that
situation, any revenues would be offset by the lease payments and any other business expenses. I.R.C.
§§ 63, 162. The residual profits would necessarily represent the earnings from the plumber’s labor
because every other factor of production has been accounted for as an expense.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 15 (describing how the employment tax base
includes some capital income, while the base excludes certain labor income).
20. See infra notes 66–108 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
23. Garrett Watson & Everett Stamm, Sources of Personal Income, Tax Year 2017 Update, TAX
FOUND. NO. 719, at 5 tbl.1.4 (July 2020), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20200715145103/Sources-ofPersonal-Income-Tax-Year-2017-Update.pdf. The figure represents profits from businesses other
than those that are classified as a C corporation. Therefore, it reflects income from sole
proprietorships, S corporations, and partnerships.
24. Id.
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taxpayers, business income accounts for no more than 5% of their total
income.25 This pattern is magnified at the highest levels of income. Another
study based on data from 2014 returns showed that business income accounts
for almost half of the income of individuals in the top 0.1%, compared to
roughly 30% for individuals at the top 1%.26 Therefore, for high-income
taxpayers, business income is a more significant component of total income—
both as a share of total income and in absolute terms. More significantly,
approximately 75% of business income reported by these high-income
taxpayers actually represents income attributable to the work that the owner
performs for the business.27 That is because they operate through a formal
business entity that permits them to do what Gingrich and Edwards did:
disguise their labor income as business profits.28 By comparison, less
sophisticated, lower-income individuals are much more likely to earn business
profits as sole proprietors, making them obligated to treat all their profits as
labor income.29 In short, the more flexible rules mostly benefit high-income
taxpayers, while the inflexible rules mostly penalize low-income taxpayers.
Therefore, until the employment tax rules are reformed, they will enable the
rich to get richer faster, helping to expand the gap separating the haves and
the have nots.
These inequitable outcomes would not occur if it were possible to isolate
the returns on labor from the other profits derived by a self-employed
individual. However, it is unrealistic to expect that any mechanism will
precisely isolate such amounts. Nevertheless, that should not deter
policymakers from attempting to devise a mechanism that will be an
improvement over the current situation, even if it falls short of absolute
perfection.30 The 2017 Tax Act did nothing to alleviate this situation.
25. Id.
26. Matthew Smith et al., Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1675, 1690
fig.I(B), 1691 (2019). The figures represent profits from all business firms, including C corporations,
S corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships. Id. at 1685.
27. Id. at 1721. In order to measure the amount of labor income included in the owner’s profit
share, the researchers compared a firm’s profits immediately before and after the premature death of
an owner or the retirement of an owner. Id. at 1710–21.
28. Id. at 1684; see also infra notes 66–108 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Darrell Zahorsky, The Pros and Cons of a Sole Proprietorship, BALANCE SMALL
BUS., https://www.thebalancesmb.com/sole-proprietorship-the-right-business-structure-2951775 (last
updated Dec. 10, 2018) (noting the low-cost and simplified management requirements of starting a
sole proprietorship); see also infra note 58 and accompanying text.
30. See Hayley Reynolds & Thomas Neubig, Distinguishing Between “Normal” and “Excess”
Returns for Tax Policy 10 (OECD, Working Paper No. 28, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1787/22235558.
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Initially, the drafters included a provision that would have limited the
employment tax base to amounts determined to represent the labor income of
self-employed individuals.31 That same provision also would have eliminated
the discretion that such taxpayers now have to reduce their employment tax
base. Unfortunately, the provision was removed at an early stage of the
legislative process and never reappeared in any form.
Yet, the 2017 Tax Act included another provision that might serve as a
framework for future efforts to isolate labor income for employment tax
purposes. Known as the GILTI tax, this new provision is designed to prevent
companies from avoiding U.S. tax on income generated by foreign affiliates.32
Although the acronym stands for Global Intangible Low Taxed Income, the
tax does not require the foreign affiliate to own any intangible assets. Instead,
the statute merely seeks to determine the profits that are subject to U.S. tax
and the profits that are exempt from U.S. tax. Under the statute, the exempt
portion is the amount attributable to a 10% return on the adjusted tax basis of
the affiliate’s investments in tangible business property.33 All profits
exceeding that amount are subject to U.S. tax.34 As a practical matter, the
10% return is the statute’s way of answering the following question: How
much did the foreign affiliate’s capital investments contribute to the firm’s
profits? The GILTI rules assume that the contribution is equal to 10% of the
adjusted tax basis of such property.
The capital investments made by a foreign affiliate of a multinational
enterprise are comparable to the capital investments that a self-employed
individual might make in their business. The only difference is that the
residual profits will represent something different in each context. For a
multinational enterprise, the GILTI statute treats the amount as intangible
income that is subject to U.S. tax. In the self-employment context, such
residual profits will represent the business owner’s labor income. For this
reason, the GILTI rules might inform a set of reforms that would cause selfemployed individuals to determine their employment tax base in a more
consistent and principled way.
This Article will describe in greater detail the basic contours of such a
reform. Before doing so, Part II describes the existing employment tax rules,
focusing on the various ways they apply to a self-employed individual. Part
31.
32.
33.
34.

See infra notes 159–170 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 951A (2018).
I.R.C. § 951A(b)(2)(A).
I.R.C. § 951(b)(1).
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III explains how certain self-employed individuals can use the rules to limit
their employment tax base and the tax they owe. Part IV describes the
distortions and inequities that are produced under the current employment tax
rules. Part V recounts legislative efforts to isolate labor income and shows
how those efforts came to bear fruit in the GILTI rules and elsewhere in the
2017 Tax Act. Part VI describes a framework for reform inspired by the
GILTI rules. Part VII concludes.
II. THE EMPLOYMENT TAX SYSTEM AND THE SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUAL
The rules for computing the employment tax base for a self-employed
individual will depend on the tax classification for the business. That
classification will partly depend on the state law business form that someone
uses to operate their business.
A. Business Forms and Tax Classifications
State law generally offers the following four options for conducting a
business: the sole proprietorship, the limited liability company (LLC), the
corporation, and various forms of the partnership. If a self-employed person
is the only owner, the menu of options consists of the sole proprietorship, the
LLC, and the corporation. In situations where the individual has a business
partner, the menu consists of the partnership (and its variations), the
corporation, and the LLC.
Each state law business form has a default tax classification.
Nevertheless, in many instances, the owners of the business can choose a
different tax classification. The firm’s tax classification will dictate which
set of employment tax rules will apply to the firm's owners. 35 The relevant
tax classifications are the C corporation, the S corporation, the partnership,
and the disregarded entity. Any firm that is incorporated under state law is a
C corporation by default, but the owners can elect to classify the firm as an
S corporation if certain conditions are met.36 Any state law partnership is
35. The tax classification will also dictate the extent to which the firm’s profits are subject to the
income tax. The profits of a C corporation are taxed to the firm when earned, and again to the
shareholders when they receive the profits as a dividend. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a)(7). In every other
case, each owner of the firm is taxed on their share of the firm’s profits, whether they receive an actual
distribution or not. Id. §§ 702 (partnerships), 1366 (S corporations), 61(a)(2) (disregarded entities).
The firm itself pays no tax on its profits. Id. §§ 701 (partnerships), 1363 (S corporations).
36. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (2020) (the default classification); I.R.C. §§ 1362(a)(1) (2018),
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classified as a partnership for tax purposes by default. 37 However, the owners
can elect to classify the firm as either a C corporation or an S corporation for
tax purposes.38 The options for LLCs depend on whether the company has
only one member or not. A single member LLC is disregarded for tax
purposes.39 However, it can elect to be classified as a C corporation or an S
corporation.40 A multimember LLC is classified as a partnership by default. 41
But it can elect to be classified as a C corporation or an S corporation. 42 The
sole proprietorship is disregarded for tax purposes.43 It is the only business
form that cannot choose a different tax classification. The remainder of this
Article will refer to businesses by their tax classifications.
B. The Employment Tax Statutes
The U.S. has two separate employment tax regimes: the Federal
Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) and the Self-Employment Contribution
Act (SECA).44 Both statutes impose two separate taxes. The first is a 12.4%
tax earmarked to finance the social security program.45 The second is a 2.9%
hospital insurance tax, which raises funds to support the Medicare program. 46
There is a limit on the amounts that are subject to the social security tax.
Known as the contribution and benefit base, it is fixed at $142,800 for 2021.47

1363(a) (2005) (the S corporation election).
37. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i) (2020).
38. Id. § 301.7701-3(a) (the C corporation election); I.R.C. §§ 1362(a)(1) (2018), 1363(a) (2005)
(the S corporation election).
39. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii) (2019).
40. See supra note 38.
41. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i) (2019).
42. See supra note 38.
43. By regulation, only those unincorporated business ventures involving more than one person
constitute a separate business entity for tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (2019). As a
result, a sole proprietorship is not a separate business entity in the eyes of tax law because it is an
unincorporated business venture undertaken by only one person. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2)
(providing examples of when ventures qualify as separate business entities).
44. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101 (2018), 1401(a) (detailing FICA and SECA, respectively).
45. I.R.C. § 1401(a) (2014) (SECA). In the case of FICA, the employer and employee each pay
half the tax. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a) (2018), 3111(a) (2018).
46. I.R.C. § 1401(b)(1) (2014) (SECA). In the case of FICA, the employer and employee each
pay half the tax. I.R.C. §§ 3101(b)(1), 3111(b) (2018).
47. Cost of Living Adjustments, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (last visited Apr. 13, 2021),
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/colasummary.html (providing updates on the adjustments made to the
Social Security tax base).
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Any amounts above that limit are exempt from the tax.48 The contribution
and benefit base is adjusted each year to reflect increases in the average
wages of the U.S. economy.49 The SECA and FICA taxes are coordinated so
that the social security tax will never apply to an amount exceeding the
contribution and benefit base in effect for any year.50 By operating in this
way, the rules ensure that anyone whose income includes earnings from
multiple sources will not be at a disadvantage compared to someone who does
not.
Unlike the social security tax, the Medicare tax is imposed on an
individual's entire employment tax base.51 Moreover, starting in 2013, in
order to help pay for Obamacare, an additional 0.9% Medicare surtax has
also applied to the extent the taxpayer’s income exceeds certain thresholds.52
For a married couple filing a joint return, the threshold is $250,000, for
unmarried individuals, it is $200,000, and for married individuals filing a
separate return, it is $125,000.53
FICA is the original statute that Congress enacted to fund the social
security program. It generally covers anyone who works as an employee. 54
Congress passed SECA later when it wanted to extend social security
coverage to certain self-employed individuals.55 However, there are two
instances when FICA––not SECA––determines the employment tax liability
of a self-employed person: when the business is conducted through a C
corporation or an S corporation. The tax law treats those firms as separate
legal entities that are distinct from their owner, even if they are wholly owned
by one person. In the employment tax context, this means that an individual

48. However, as a candidate for President, Joseph Biden proposed imposing the tax on earnings
above $400,000, in addition to the amounts below the contribution and benefit base. See, e.g., Melanie
Waddell, Biden’s Plan Would Create Payroll Tax ‘Donut Hole,’ THINKADVISOR (Sept. 16, 2020,
11:20 AM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2020/09/16/biden-plan-payroll-tax-donut-hole/.
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 430 (West 2021).
50. See I.R.C. §§ 1402(b), 3121(a) (2018). Thus, for example, if an individual has $150,000 of
wages from employment in 2021, the FICA social security tax would apply to the first $142,800,
leaving nothing earned as self-employment income subject to the tax. See I.R.C. § 3121(a).
Alternatively, if an individual has $40,000 of wages in 2021, the entire amount would be subject to
the social security tax, while up to $102,800 of self-employment income would be subject to the social
security tax under SECA. See I.R.C. § 1402(b).
51. See I.R.C. §§ 1401(b)(2)(1) (SECA), 3101(b)(1) (FICA).
52. I.R.C. § 1401(b)(2)(A) (SECA), 3101(b)(2) (FICA).
53. Id.
54. Dilley, supra note 14, at 70–72.
55. Id. at 72–73.
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who works for a corporation that they own is treated as an employee of the
firm, even if there are no other shareholders. Such an employee–owner will
be subject to employment tax solely on amounts they receive as wages from
the firm, just like anyone who works for an unrelated employer. 56
The employment tax base is determined in a different way under SECA,
which applies to any self-employed individual engaged in business through
a partnership or a disregarded entity. The SECA tax base is referred to as net
earnings from self-employment (NESE).57 If the firm is disregarded, NESE
includes all the profits derived by the business, other than certain items of
passive income, like certain rentals from real estate, corporate dividends,
interest, and gains from the sale of capital assets.58 In other words, the statute
essentially assumes that all of the active business profits are attributable to
the owner’s labor, even in situations where the business requires a
combination of labor and capital.
In the case of a partnership, however, SECA uses two different methods
to determine someone’s tax base, depending on whether the owner is a
general partner or a limited partner in the firm. The tax base of a limited
partner consists solely of amounts they receive as “guaranteed payments” for
their work.59 This is roughly analogous to amounts that would qualify as
wages under FICA. A limited partner is not subject to employment tax on
any amounts that are earmarked for them as a distributive share allocation of
the firm's profits.60 There is a historical explanation for this rule. When it
was adopted, limited partners were expected to be passive investors who ran
the risk of losing their liability protection if they played an active role in
managing the firm. Thus, their profit shares generally would not represent
any form of compensation for their work.61 Rather, to the extent they
performed any services for the firm, a limited partner would have been
specifically compensated for doing so. The guaranteed payment was
expected to capture that. Even though most state laws now permit limited
partners to play active roles in the firm without jeopardizing their liability
protection, the tax rules have not been updated to reflect this change.
If someone is a general partner in a partnership, their employment tax
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (2018).
I.R.C. § 1402(a) (defining “net earnings from self-employment”).
Id. §§ 1402(a)(1)–(3).
I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).
Cf. id.
See Fritz, supra note 14, at 830–31 (citing sources).
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base consists of both their distributive share allocation of the firm’s profits
(other than the same passive items that are excluded from the tax base of a
sole proprietor) and any guaranteed payments that they are entitled to
receive.62 This parallels the way sole proprietors are treated; everything
counts as income from labor, even in situations where the business entails a
combination of both labor and capital.
III. OPTIONS TO CONTROL THE EMPLOYMENT TAX BASE
Both FICA and SECA are intended to impose a tax on income from labor,
as opposed to any returns on capital.63 Yet, when someone is self-employed,
the statutes almost never operate that way for two reasons. For some
taxpayers, the statute rigidly requires them to treat virtually all their business
profits as labor income. For other taxpayers, the statute permits them to
artificially limit what counts as labor income. These glitches are best
understood by considering each business classification in turn.
A. Disregarded Entities
Sole proprietors and single member limited liability companies are
disregarded as separate entities for tax purposes. When a taxpayer operates a
business in one of these ways, their employment tax base will include all the
income derived by the business other than certain items of passive income.64
Because there is no way to modify that outcome, the tax base will necessarily
include the returns on any capital invested in the business, making it
overinclusive.
B. C Corporations
The FICA tax will apply to a self-employed individual when that person
operates a business that is classified as a C corporation.65 In that situation,
only amounts that the firm pays to the employee–shareholder as remuneration
for employment count as “wages” from employment.66 The tax base simply
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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I.R.C. §§ 1402(a), 1402(a)(13).
Dilley, supra note 14, at 74.
I.R.C. §§ 1402(a)(1)–(3).
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 3121(a); see also Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 C.B. 225.
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will not include the individual’s share of any other profits of the business,
including dividends or undistributed earnings, even if those amounts solely
represent the product of their labor. Moreover, these items will not be subject
to SECA either.67
Because FICA limits the tax base to amounts received as ‘wages,” selfemployed individuals operating through a C corporation can control their
employment tax liability. They can decide whether they receive a wage, how
much they receive, and when they receive it. That enables them to control
whether they pay any FICA tax, how much they pay and when they must do
so.
Not only is there an opportunity to understate the earnings that are
attributable to one’s labor, there is also an incentive to do so when one
operates through a corporation. Prior to the changes introduced by the 2017
Tax Act, there was an incentive for a C corporation to understate the
compensation it paid to employee–owners when the firm was subject to tax at
the lowest marginal rates and to overstate it when the firm was subject to tax
at the highest marginal rates.68 The 2017 Tax Act replaced the marginal tax
schedule on corporate income and replaced it with a flat rate of 21%.69 The
legislation also modified the marginal tax rates that apply to individuals.70
The combined changes have made the C corporation a more attractive tax
avoidance vehicle for self-employed persons.71 These individuals will
continue to be better off in at least two scenarios. One option is to withdraw
the earnings as a dividend. The combined tax on such a payment will be lower
than the combined tax on a payment structured as wages.72 The other option
is to simply allow the earnings to remain with the firm.73 That would limit the
67. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2).
68. Nicholas Bull & Paul Burnham, Taxation of Capital and Labor: The Diverse Landscape by
Entity Type, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 397, 402 & tbl. 1 (2008).
69. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2017).
70. See id. § 1(j).
71. One team of scholars went so far as to quantify the number of firms that would reclassify
themselves as C corporations. See Penn Wharton Budget Model, Projecting the Mass Conversion
from Pass-Through Entities to C-Corporations 1, https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/
issues/2018/6/12/projecting-the-mass-conversion-from-pass-through-entities-to-c-corporations (last
updated June 13, 2018).
72. See David J. Roberts, Undercompensated Shareholder–Employees and the New Rate
Structure, 162 TAX NOTES 165, 167 (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notesfederal/corporate-taxation/undercompensated-shareholder-employees-and-new-ratestructure/2019/01/14/28qm7.
73. See David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches
Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1454 (2019).
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tax to the 21% corporate tax without triggering any income or employment
taxes that would apply to amounts that the firm transfers to its owners.
As a technical matter, if the corporation pays someone for work, the law
requires that any compensation they receive be “reasonable.”74 However, that
requirement has an important limitation. It has never been used to create a
payment that the firm never made to a worker.75 Therefore, it fails to restrain
a self-employed person who refuses a salary and simply allows the firm’s
earnings to remain in the firm. At most, the reasonable compensation
requirement permits the government to assert that a payment structured as a
corporate dividend should be treated as wages for income and employment
tax purposes. However, because the government is in no position to audit
every tax return filed by a closely held corporation, the vast majority of these
cases are left undetected and unprosecuted.76 In the rare instance when a
business is selected for audit, the government must engage in a complex
inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case, draining scarce
resources and sometimes leading to costly litigation.77
Even when it does pay compensation to an employee–shareholder, a C
corporation can also limit the employment tax liability if it pays careful
attention to the timing of the payment. Because compensation in excess of
the FICA contribution and benefit base is exempt from the OASDI component
of the tax, employment taxes can be saved by compressing multiple years’
compensation into a single year. Therefore, even when the employment tax
is triggered, the tax liability can be managed and controlled by the individual
who owns and controls the corporation that employs him.
C. S Corporations
A shareholder–employee of an S corporation exercises the same power to
74. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2017).
75. See Ari Glogower & David Kamin, Sheltering Income Through a Corporation, 164 TAX
NOTES FED. 507, 514 (July 22, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473899.
76. “The examination rate for individual returns declined from 1.1 percent to 0.6 percent from
2010 to 2018,” with the largest declines occurring at the high end of the income spectrum.
Congressional Budget Office, Trends in the Internal Revenue Service’s Funding and Enforcement 11
(July 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56467. The examination rate for corporate returns
declined from 1.4 percent to 0.9 percent during the same period. Id. at 12. See also Roberts, supra
note 72, at 167 (explaining how the IRS lacks the funds to audit every corporation).
77. E.g., Charlotte’s Off. Boutique, Inc., v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 121 T.C. 89, 91 (2003)
(holding that royalties paid to sole shareholder–employee should be treated as wages subject to FICA
tax), aff’d, 425 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2005).
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control their employment tax base as does their C corporation counterpart.
They can simply minimize or eliminate the wages they receive from the firm.
However, the incentive to do so is even stronger in the case of an S
corporation. Unlike a C corporation, an S corporation is not subject to tax on
its earnings.78 Instead, each owner pays tax on their share of the firm’s profits,
whether they receive any or not.79 Thus, actual distributions of profits are
generally tax free to the recipient, while any wages paid by the firm will
reduce its profits dollar for dollar.80 Both profits and wages are subject to
income tax at the marginal rates, which range from 10% to 40.8%.81 However,
the wages will trigger the employment tax, while the profit shares will not.82
In other words, there is never a financial incentive for an S corporation
shareholder–employee to receive a wage as compensation for their work.
Prior to the 2017 Tax Act, there was overwhelming evidence that S
corporations grossly understated the compensation paid to controlling owners
with alarming frequency. In 2006, 56% of S corporations had one
shareholder, while another 28% had two shareholders.83 These closely held
firms routinely paid nothing to their officers in the form of compensation. For
single shareholder S corporations, the rate was 58% in 2005, while the rate
was 29% when the corporation had two shareholders.84 A separate study from
2000 revealed a similar pattern. In that year, “78.9 percent of all S
corporations were either fully owned by a single shareholder (69.5 percent) or
more than 50 percent owned by a single shareholder (9.5 percent).”85 When
the corporation had only one owner, the average salary paid out to the owner
equaled only 41.5% of firm profits.86 More recent studies show that the
situation has not improved. In a study of S corporation returns for 2013, 30%
of the firms reported no form of compensation expense to the owners or to
anyone else.87 Moreover, owner compensation has accounted for a decreasing
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2018).
Id. § 1366.
Id. §§ 1368 (distributions), 162(a) (deductions).
Id. §§ 1(j) (income tax), 1411 (Medicare surtax).
See id. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a).
1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 313, chart 1.20.7.
Id. at 314, chart 1.20.8.
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO ELIMINATE
INEQUITIES IN THE EMPLOYMENT TAX LIABILITIES OF SOLE PROPRIETORS AND SINGLE
SHAREHOLDER S CORPORATIONS 3–4 (2005).
86. Id. at 5.
87. Susan C. Nelson, Paying Themselves: S Corporation Owners and Trends in S Corporation
Income, 1980–2013 8–9, fig.1 (Dep’t of the Treasury, Off. of Tax Analysis, Working Paper No. 107,
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share of the amounts that the owner receives from such firms.88 In the early
1980s, officer compensation accounted for 80% of their total income from the
firm.89 Since 2010, that figure has been below 40%.90
There is very little to constrain S corporations from underpaying their
controlling owners. The reasonable compensation requirement, which at least
theoretically permits the government to attack dividends as disguised
compensation in the C corporation setting, is impotent if an S corporation
simply retains its earnings.91 In cases where the firm makes a payment that is
not structured as compensation, the government could try to recast the
payment as disguised compensation.92 Unfortunately, as in the C corporation
context, the government is ill-equipped to perform the kinds of audits that
would help detect all potential instances of disguised compensation.93 As a
result, the vast majority of these cases probably go unchallenged.94 The few
that are caught have the potential to draw the government into protracted
litigation, putting further pressure on the government’s limited resources.95
The changes introduced by the 2017 Tax Act did not materially alter an
individual’s incentive to use an S corporation to avoid employment tax. The
most significant change is that the owners of an S corporation can claim a
deduction equal to 20% of their share of the firm’s business profits net of any
compensation paid to the owners.96 The amount of the deduction is
determined under a complex procedure that partly depends on the amount of
compensation that the firm pays.97 But it has two opposing impacts. On the
one hand, any wages will offset the firm’s business profits, reducing the

2016).
88. Id. at 16 fig.6.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
92. E.g., Nu-Look Design, Inc. v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 927 (2003) (decision for the
government), aff’d 356 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2004); Spicer Acct., Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90 (9th
Cir. 1990) (affirming the district court decision for the government); Radtke v. United States, 712 F.
Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (summary judgment for the government), aff’d 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir.
1990).
93. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 85.
94. See Congressional Budget Office, supra note 76, at 12.
95. See, e.g., Spicer Accounting, Inc., 918 F.2d 90; Radtke, 712 F. Supp. 143; Nu-Look Design,
Inc., 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 927.
96. See I.R.C. § 199A (2018).
97. See Richard Winchester, The Deduction for Passthrough Firms: A Hodgepodge of Ideas, 158
TAX NOTES 1517 (2018).
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amount of the deduction.98 On the other hand, for certain high-income
taxpayers, the amount of the deduction is subject to a limit that is partly based
on the amount of wages paid.99 So, more wages can also translate into a larger
deduction. One scholar has determined that the net effect of these two
opposing pressures is an incentive for employee–owners to receive wages
equal to two-sevenths of business profits.100 Below that point, each additional
dollar of compensation generates tax savings that exceed any tax liability,
while above that point, each additional dollar of compensation triggers a tax
liability that exceeds the tax savings.101 In either case, the employment tax
base will not reflect the actual amount of labor income attributable to the
owner in any meaningful way.
D. Partnerships
Under current law, a partner’s exposure for the self-employment tax is
purely a function of the nature of the interest the partner owns in the
partnership. For general partners, the tax base consists of the partner’s entire
share of partnership income other than certain items of passive income.102 The
tax will also apply to any guaranteed payment the partner receives from the
firm.103 For a limited partner, the tax base consists solely of any guaranteed
payments received for the performance of services; it does not include the
partner’s share of partnership income.104
Someone who is a general partner can limit their employment tax
exposure by holding the lion’s share of their investment in the form of a
limited partner interest. Under that structure, only the partner’s relatively
small profit share associated with the general partnership interest will be
included in the tax base.105 Multi-member LLCs are classified as partnerships
by default, and the members are treated as partners for tax purposes.
However, because there is no clear way of knowing whether to treat an LLC

98. I.R.C. § 199A(c)(4)(B)–(C).
99. Id. § 199A(b)(2)(B).
100. Amy E. Sheridan, Compensation and Benefits Aspects of the New QBI Deduction, 159 TAX
NOTES 657, 658 (2018).
101. Karen C. Burke, Section 199A and Choice of Passthrough Entity, 72 TAX LAW. 551, 575–577
(2019).
102. I.R.C. § 1402(a) (2018).
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1974).
104. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).
105. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3); 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (Jan. 13, 1997).
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member as a general partner or a limited partner, taxpayers are left to their
own devices. On the one hand, it would seem appropriate to treat a member
as equivalent to a general partner because, under the default rules, all members
are entitled to participate in the management of the company.106 On the other
hand, one could argue that the limited partnership rules should apply on the
grounds that a member enjoys limited liability from the debts and obligations
of the business, the hallmark of a limited partner’s status as such.107
Understandably, the absence of a clear rule has been an invitation for some to
contend that a member must observe the rules that apply to limited partners.108
Taking that position minimizes the member’s employment tax base to the
payments they receive in exchange for their work.109
Over the past decade, courts have stepped in to eliminate the statutory
ambiguities, generally adopting the government’s position that an individual
will not be treated as a limited partner for employment tax purposes if the
individual is an active participant in the business or if they can exercise
management powers.110 The Internal Revenue Service has also launched a
compliance campaign to target instances where taxpayers inappropriately
claim to qualify for the exemption available to limited partners.111 However,
litigation is labor intensive and can only be expected to reach a small minority
of offenders.

106. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 407(a), (c) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs
on Unif. State Laws 2006). The self-employment tax was drafted to apply different rules to general
and limited partners because, at the time this distinction was drawn, a limited partner ran the risk of
losing their limited liability if they participated in the management of the partnership’s business. See
2 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL
TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 277–87 (2001). State laws now permit limited partners to
participate in management without jeopardizing that protection. See id.
107. See Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 303 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on
Unif. State Laws 2006).
108. See, e.g., Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, New Incentive for Avoiding SE and FICA
Tax, 81 TAX NOTES 1389, 1389–90 (1998).
109. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (2018).
110. E.g., Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r., 136 T.C. 137 (2011) (requiring
individuals who held both management units and investing units in a partnership to include their entire
allocation of firm profits in their self-employment tax base); Riether v. United States, 919 F. Supp. 2d
1140 (D.N.M. 2012) (requiring two spouses who were the sole members of an LLC to include the
entire allocation of firm profits in their self-employment tax base); Castigliola v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1296 (T.C. 2017) (requiring members of a member managed professional
LLC to include their entire allocation of firm profits in their self-employment tax base).
111. Saul Mezei et al., IRS Self-Employment Campaign Heats Up, 93 TAX NOTES FED. 1033 (2019).
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IV. ARBITRARY OUTCOMES UNDER CURRENT LAW
The inconsistent rules and opportunities to control the employment tax
base have produced outcomes that are hard to defend. Simply put, the
employment tax base for a self-employed individual will almost never
approximate their labor income. This is confirmed by the few studies that
have attempted to quantify the extent to which the employment tax base
overstates or understates labor income.
Two government economists examined business tax returns filed between
2000 and 2004 to determine the share of business income that was a product
of the owner’s labor.112 They used a regression technique to estimate the
extent to which the employment tax base either overstated or understated the
owner’s labor income.113 There were substantial disparities between the
amounts that were subject to employment tax and what the researchers
determined to be the “true” labor income of the firm’s owners.114 Not
surprisingly, the employment tax base is overstated for sole proprietors and
general partners and understated for other self-employed individuals.115 For
sole proprietors, over 21% of the income subject to employment tax was
income from capital.116 For general partnerships, 36% of the income subject
to employment tax was income from capital.117 By contrast, in limited
partnerships, only 31% of income from labor was subject to employment
tax.118 For S corporations, only 65% of income from labor was subject to
employment tax.119 The owners of closely held C corporations also
understated their true labor income, reporting only 87% of the total amount as
part of their employment tax base.120
An earlier study by the Congressional Budget Office reached consistent
conclusions.121 Focusing on returns for profitable partnerships and sole
proprietorships filed for 2004, that study quantified the extent to which the

112. Bull & Burnham, supra note 65, at 413.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 414 tbl.9
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The researchers defined a closely held C corporation as any C corporation with fewer than
75 shareholders. Id. at 398 n.4.
121. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 15, at iv.
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SECA tax base failed to reflect returns on labor.122 The study concluded that
only 58% of the tax base reflected labor income, while the remaining 42%
reflected capital income.123 Equally troubling, the study found that the labor
income included in the base represented only 44% of the labor income for the
business owners.124 In other words, the employment tax base fails to reflect
labor income in a very substantial way, overstating it in some cases and
understating it in others. This outcome is not surprising, considering the
haphazard way the rules operate and the incentives built into the law.
These two studies examined periods of time that predated the 2017 Tax
Act. As explained above, that legislation changed the landscape in some
significant ways. The corporate tax is now imposed at a flat rate of 21%
instead of at graduated rates ranging from 15% to 35%.125 Furthermore, the
owners of unincorporated firms can now claim a deduction for qualified
business income.126 Those developments can be expected to affect taxpayer
behavior in different ways, as explained above. However, the larger point is
that the employment tax base is determined in an inconsistent and
unprincipled manner, preventing it from reflecting labor income and only
labor income.
V. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO ISOLATE LABOR INCOME
The GILTI rules adopted as part of the 2017 Tax Act may be the first tax
provisions ever enacted to contain an objective procedure for isolating the
returns to capital from the other components of business profits. However,
they do not represent the first attempt that Congress has made to devise such
rules. That honor belongs to a 2014 legislative proposal that endeavored to
harmonize certain employment tax reforms with proposed changes to the
taxation of business profits.127 Those proposals ultimately informed key
aspects of the 2017 Tax Act, including the GILTI rules.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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I.R.C. § 11(b) (2018).
See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
See H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014).
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A. The Tax Reform Act of 2014
The Tax Reform Act of 2014 attempted to overhaul the U.S. tax system
in some fundamental ways. Authored by Representative David Camp, the
Democratic Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, its
overarching objective was to eliminate a variety of deductions in order to
expand the tax base, thereby permitting Congress to reduce the statutory tax
rates without adversely affecting revenues. One of its signature features was
a reduction in the corporate tax and the top individual tax to 25%.128 That
would have established superficial parity in the tax rates that would apply to
profits across all business firms.129 In addition, the proposal would have
required all partners and S corporation owners to determine their employment
tax base under a uniform set of rules.130 Those rules divided these business
owners into two groups: the active owners and the passive owners.131
Someone would be an active owner if they were a material participant in the
business, as measured by a well-developed set of objective standards that
appear in the passive activity loss rules, while anyone else was a passive
owner.132 The employment tax base for a passive owner was limited to the
compensation they received for their work.133 For active owners, the
employment tax base included these same amounts, but also included the
owner’s share of the firm’s profits (other than the passive items of income that
are already excluded from the SECA tax base).134 However, an active owner
was entitled to a deduction equal to up to 30% of the combined amount.135
128. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 2014, A DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS TO
REFORM THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: TITLE I—TAX REFORM FOR INDIVIDUALS 6 (2014)
[hereinafter JCT REPORT ON TITLE I]; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, A DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TO REFORM THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: TITLE III—
BUSINESS TAX REFORM 2–3 (Feb. 26, 2014).
129. The parity is not complete because corporate profits are subject to tax again when they are
distributed to the owners as dividends. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (2018).
130. JCT REPORT ON TITLE I, supra note 128, at 82–85.
131. Id.
132. See I.R.C. § 469(h). Under the legislation, the participation of an individual’s spouse and lineal
decedents also would be considered to determine whether the owner was a material participant. JCT
REPORT ON TITLE I, supra note 128, at 85.
133. JCT REPORT ON TITLE I, supra note 128, at 84–85.
134. Id. at 83.
135. Id. at 84–85. However, for an active S corporation owner, their employment tax base would
never be less than their wages subject to FICA. Id. at 84.
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This adjustment was designed to reflect the historical portion of the U.S.
domestic product that represents non-labor income.136 The Tax Reform Act
of 2014 was never formally introduced as a bill.137 However, many of its key
themes are reflected in certain parts of the 2017 Tax Act.
B. The 2017 Tax Act
In 2016, the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives
released a Tax Reform Blueprint that built on some of the ideas and themes
reflected in the 2014 Democratic proposal.138 First, it envisioned a reduction
in the corporate tax down to 20%.139 In order to establish parity in the taxation
of business profits across all business firms, it also contemplated a special,
preferential rate of tax on the income from S corporations, partnerships, and
sole proprietors.140 The original idea was simply to limit the tax on such
income to the rate imposed on corporate profits.141 However, the Blueprint
always envisioned a system that contained a mechanism to ensure that any
element of labor income embedded in a taxpayer’s business income was
subject to tax at ordinary rates.142 Unlike the 2014 Democratic proposal, the
Republican Blueprint also advocated a shift toward rules that allowed the tax
system to operate more like a consumption tax so that income from savings
and investment would enjoy some form of tax relief.143
The broad themes expressed in the Republican Blueprint were later
incorporated into a Unified Framework that was endorsed by both the Trump
Administration and the Republican leadership in both Houses of Congress.144
136. Id. at 83. Incidentally, recent empirical studies have demonstrated that labor has accounted for
a declining share of national income. One study based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
determined that the labor share declined from 63% to 57% between 1980 and 2016. JAMES MANYIKA
ET AL., A NEW LOOK AT THE DECLINING LABOR SHARE OF INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES 6 exhibit
2 (Peter Gumbel et al. eds., 2019).
137. H.R.1 - Tax Reform Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/house-bill/1 (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (showing the act was introduced but no other action
was taken).
138. See TAX REFORM TASK FORCE, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA
(June 24, 2016), https://khn.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/04/ryan_a_better_way_policy_
paper_062416.pdf.
139. Id. at 25.
140. Id. at 17, 23.
141. Id. at 17.
142. Id. at 20.
143. Id. at 24–25.
144. DEP’T OF TREASURY, UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR FIXING OUR BROKEN TAX CODE (2017).
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One of its five core principles was to provide tax relief to businesses,
especially small businesses.145 It expected to achieve this by lowering the
corporate tax to 20%, while reducing the tax on other business profits to 25%,
with rules to ensure that this preferential rate would not apply to amounts
representing labor income.146 The framework also endeavored to adopt a
territorial system of taxation to replace the existing one that imposed tax on a
person’s worldwide income.147 In order to protect the U.S. tax base, the plan
was to incorporate rules that would subject foreign earnings to U.S. tax at a
lower rate.148
These broad themes were eventually reduced to legislative language in
two separate bills, with a different one introduced in each house of
Congress.149 However, there were elements that were common to each bill.150
First, each bill restructured the corporate tax from a graduated tax up to 35%
to a flat tax of 20%.151 In addition, consistent with the Blueprint and the
Unified Framework, the drafters attempted to provide comparable tax relief
to businesses that were not subject to the corporate tax.152 This came in the
form of a special maximum tax on a new category of income called qualified
business income. It represented a portion of the taxpayer’s share of the profits
from S corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships. Neither bill
imposed this tax on the taxpayer’s entire share of income from these
businesses because doing so would have permitted the tax relief to extend to
the labor income that the taxpayer may have derived through the business.153
That would have been inconsistent with the principles outlined in the
Republican Blueprint and the Unified Framework. Instead, the idea was for

145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Id. at 9.
148. Id.
149. Lee A. Sheppard, Money Talks: Passthrough Provisions of the Tax Reform Bills, 157 TAX
NOTES 1477, 1478–79 (Dec. 11, 2017) (stating that the House and Senate had separate versions of the
bill).
150. Id. at 1479.
151. H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 226 (2017) (proposing a corporate flat tax of 20%); STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAX’N., 115TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S MARK OF THE “TAX CUTS AND
JOBS ACT” 55 (2017) (changing the graduated corporate rate to a flat 20%).
152. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Your Easy Guide to Passthrough Rules in the
Conference Report, 158 TAX NOTES 23 (Jan. 1, 2018); Donald B. Susswein, Understanding the New
Passthrough Rules, 158 TAX NOTES 497 (Jan. 22, 2018).
153. Sheppard, supra note 149, at 1478; Susswein, supra note 152, at 497.
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the relief solely to benefit the returns on capital invested in such firms.154 This
was important for two related reasons. First, the drafters wanted to preserve
the distinction that the tax code historically has drawn between income from
labor and other forms of income.155 Second, preserving that distinction would
be consistent with the way the corporate tax—and the reduction in that tax—
would operate.156 Any wages paid by a corporation reduces the profits that
are subject to the corporate tax. Thus, to the extent that the amount paid out
as wages accurately reflects the income from labor, the residual corporate
profits represent a return on capital. So, a cut in the corporate tax effectively
represents solely a cut in the tax on the returns on the capital invested in the
business.
The drafters wanted to achieve the same outcome for
unincorporated businesses.157
Under the House bill, the return on capital was determined in different
ways depending on two factors: whether the firm was a service business, and
whether the taxpayer was an active participant in the firm.158 As a general
rule, none of the income derived by a service firm was assumed to consist of
a return on any capital.159 For non-service firms, the return on capital would
depend on whether the taxpayer was an active participant in the business or
not.160 For passive participants, their entire share of the firm’s profits would
be treated as a return on capital, just like shareholders in a corporation.161 For
active participants, the bill assumed that any amounts invested by the firm in
capital assets would earn a return at the rate of 7 percentage points above the
short-term applicable federal rate (AFR+7).162 However, under the bill, no
less than 30% of a taxpayer’s share of a firm’s income would represent a
return on capital.163 The drafters considered AFR+7 to be a normal return.164
The 70/30 split reflects the ratio of labor income to capital income in the

154. Susswein, supra note 152, at 497.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Sullivan, supra note 152, at 23.
158. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION., 115TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS
AND JOBS ACT” 21–22 (2017) [hereinafter JCT REPORT ON H.R. 1].
159. Id. at 21.
160. Id. at 22.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 18.
164. H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT H.R. 1 SECTION-BY-SECTION
SUMMARY 66 (2017).
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national economy.165 The idea of using a 70/30 ratio can be traced back to the
democratic legislation introduced in 2014 by Chairman Camp.166 Although
simple to administer, this procedure was criticized for having the potential to
produce inaccurate and inequitable results because there is no universally
agreed upon method for teasing out the components of business profits.167
For individuals, the distinction between capital returns and labor income
had two impacts on their tax liability under the bill. First, to the extent the
profits from a flow through business were determined to represent returns on
capital, the taxpayer’s share of those profits would be subject to income tax at
no more than 25%.168 That compares to the bill’s top marginal rate for
individuals of 39.6%.169 Second, the taxpayer’s share of any profits exceeding
this amount was treated as income from labor and included in the employment
tax base.170
The House bill contained one other provision that required the law to
isolate the portion of a firm’s income attributable to the returns on capital. It
was described as a base erosion rule and it represents an early version of the
GILTI rules that were ultimately enacted into law. Under the House bill, a
10% owner of a foreign corporation was subject to tax on their share of the
foreign corporation’s income exceeding a specified return on amounts
invested in tangible property other than land.171 As under the rules for
segregating the profits of passthrough firms, the provision assumed that any
amounts invested by the firm in capital assets would earn a rate of return of
AFR+7.172 The provision had the effect of exempting from U.S. tax the return
on the capital investments made by foreign affiliates. Any earnings exceeding
that threshold would be taxed to the owners of the firm. However, the owners
would be entitled to exclude half of the amounts allocated to them.173 That
effectively caused these residual amounts to be taxed at half the taxpayer’s

165. Id. at 5.
166. See supra notes 128–136 and accompanying text.
167. See Emily L. Foster, Tax Bill’s Passthrough Business Income Rules Raise Concerns, 2017 TAX
NOTES 214–15 (Nov. 7, 2017) (quoting another source); Marie Sapirie, Passthroughs Get 25 Percent
Rate Under Brady Bill, 157 TAX NOTES 734, 734–35 (Nov. 6, 2017) (citing another source); see also
Reynolds & Neubig, supra note 30.
168. JCT REPORT ON H.R. 1, supra note 158, at 17.
169. Id. at 7.
170. Id. at 22.
171. Id. at 265.
172. Id. at 265.
173. Id.
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marginal rate.
The full House approved both the GILTI provisions and the rules for
passthrough firms.174 However, the employment tax provisions did not appear
in the bill as reported out of Committee or in any later version of the
legislation.
The bill introduced in the Senate also endeavored to tax the returns to
capital at a lower rate. However, it did not do so explicitly in cases where the
income was derived through a passthrough firm. By contrast, a more explicit
approach was incorporated into the bill’s GILTI rules.
Like the legislation introduced in the House, the original Senate bill
imposed a special, low rate of tax on a new category of income called qualified
business income.175 It accomplished this tax cut by authorizing taxpayers to
claim a 17.4% deduction for their share of the profits from passthrough
business firms.176 On its face, the legislation did not distinguish between
returns to capital and labor income. However, there were several aspects of
the new rule that reflected the philosophy articulated in the Republican
Blueprint. Most significantly, the deduction was not made available to high
income taxpayers when the profits were derived by a service firm.177 In
addition, any amounts that the taxpayer received as compensation for any
services performed for the firm would not be eligible for the deduction.178
Meanwhile, any investment-type income derived by the firm also would not
be eligible, which reinforced the bill’s objective to target the tax relief to
returns on capital invested in an active business, not passive income.179 The
bill reported out of committee retained these essential elements, as did the bill
approved by the entire Senate.180 The only meaningful difference is that the
deduction was increased from 17.4% to 23%.181
Not all aspects of the provision were consistent with the overarching
effort to prevent the tax cut from reaching labor income. Most significantly,
174. All Actions H.R.1 — 115th Congress, CONGRESS.GOV (2017–2018), https://www.congress.
gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1/actions (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
175. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N., 115TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S MARK OF
THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 17 (2017) [hereinafter JCT CHAIRMAN’S MARK] (describing qualified
business income).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 17–18.
178. Id. at 18.
179. Id. at 18.
180. H.R. Rep. No. 115-446, at 10–20 (2017).
181. See id. at 214–22.
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the bill imposed a limit on the amount of the deduction that could be claimed,
capping it at 50% of the wages paid by the firm.182 There are two explanations
for this feature. First, it represents an attempt to limit the cost of the new
rule.183 Second, it reflects the fact that the Senate’s version of the rule was
modeled after the manufacturing deduction that would be replaced by the new
provision.184 Therefore, in both the House and Senate bills, the intention
behind the qualified business income rules was to provide tax relief to returns
on capital. The only difference is that the House bill did so explicitly, while
the Senate bill did so in a more indirect and cumbersome manner. A revised
version of the Senate provision would ultimately be included in the legislation
that was enacted into law.185
Elsewhere in the Senate bill, the drafters included a set of provisions that
would ultimately be adopted as the GILTI rules.186 Like its counterpart in the
House, the provision required any 10% owner of a foreign corporation to pay
tax on their share of a portion of the firm’s undistributed earnings.187 The idea
was to prevent taxpayers from avoiding U.S. tax on the unrepatriated earnings
of foreign subsidiaries as part of the shift to a territorial system of taxation.
Under the provision, the earnings would be exempt from U.S. tax to the extent
they represented a return on the capital investments made by the firm
overseas.188 Such returns were assumed to be equal to a 10% return on the
adjusted tax basis of the firm’s investments in tangible property other than
land.189 Any business profits exceeding this amount would be included in the
taxable income of the foreign corporation’s 10% owners.190 This followed the
general pattern of the counterpart measure in the House bill. The only
meaningful difference for our purposes is that they used a different method
182. Id. at 217.
183. See Sheppard, supra note 149, at 1478.
184. See id. at 1479.
185. H.R. Rep. No. 115-446, supra note 180, at 222. The final bill reduced the deduction from 23%
to 20%. Id. In addition, the wage limit was revised so that the deduction was limited to the lower of
either 50% of W-2 wages or the combination of 25% of such wages and 2.5% of the non-depreciated
cost of business property. Id. This change effectively made the deduction available to real estate
firms. Lynnley Browning & Benjamin Bain, Trump, Real Estate Investors Get Late-Added Perk in
Tax Bill, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-12-18/trump-real-estate-investors-get-last-minute-perk-in-tax
186. JCT CHAIRMAN’S MARK, supra note 175, at 227.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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for isolating the returns to capital.
The Senate bill used the same method for isolating the returns to capital
in a related area.191 The legislation included a provision that was referred to
as the FDII rules, which stands for “foreign derived intangible income.”192
Broadly speaking, they are the domestic counterpart to the GILTI rules.193
The FDII rules allow domestic corporate taxpayers to claim a deduction equal
to 37.5% of a portion of the profits generated from selling goods or services
to foreign buyers for use outside the United States.194 In effect, the rule would
cause a taxpayer to pay tax at a lower rate on the income that is eligible for
the deduction. The deduction eligible portion was the amount of profits that
exceeded the returns on any capital used to generate such income.195 That
residual amount was determined under a formula which assumed that the
returns were equal to 10% of the adjusted tax basis of the firm’s investment
in tangible property other than land.196 The GILTI and FDII rules from the
Senate bill were incorporated into the final legislation and enacted into law.197
Thus, the international provisions in both the Senate and House bills
reflected a consistent effort to segregate returns on capital from other
components of business income. The only difference is that the bills
employed different ways of doing so. The House bill assumed that a capital
investment earned a return equal to APR+7 percent, while the Senate bill
assumed a 10% rate of return.198 The original House bill extended its approach
beyond the income tax rules and incorporated it into the employment tax
rules.199 That would have allowed the two systems to operate in harmony.
191. JCT CHAIRMAN’S MARK, supra note 175, at 229.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 229–30.
194. Id..
195. Id.
196. Id. at 230. As a practical matter, a larger capital investment translates into a smaller deduction
for U.S. firms. James R. Repetti, The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Kneecaps American Factory Workers,
THE HILL (Dec. 13, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/421191-the-tax-cuts-andjobs-act-kneecaps-american- factory-workers. That effectively creates an incentive for U.S. firms to
relocate their manufacturing operations to overseas affiliates. Id. That would simultaneously
maximize the FDII deduction for the U.S. firm, while also maximizing the income that is excluded
from its GILTI tax base. Id.
197. See I.R.C. §§ 250, 951A (2018).
198. Compare JCT REPORT ON H.R. 1, supra note 158, at 265 (proposing a return of APR+7) with
JCT CHAIRMAN’S MARK, supra note 175, at 227 (proposing a 10% rate).
199. See JCT REPORT ON H.R. 1, supra note 158, at 22 (explaining the House’s proposals regarding
self-employment tax); Foster, supra note 167 (“Rather than apply the 70-30 split, owners and
shareholders investing in capital-intensive businesses may elect to compute an ‘applicable percentage’
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However, because Congress extracted the employment tax reforms while
retaining a version of the new rules for qualified business income, the 2017
Tax Act made a bad situation worse. It fails to cure the dysfunctional way the
employment tax rules operate in the case of a self-employed individual, while
magnifying a discontinuity in the way the income tax system interacts with
the employment tax system.
It is not entirely clear why the employment tax provisions were removed
from the House bill. One observer expressed the view that they were extracted
for revenue reasons.200 However, that seems unlikely. Aside from making
the employment tax system operate in a more rational way, the change would
have eliminated the rules that historically have allowed owners of passthrough
firms to avoid the employment tax.201 That would have made it a revenue
raiser. According to another observer commenting on the final bill enacted
into law, it may have been too difficult or too unpopular to distinguish the
returns on capital from labor income.202 It is hard to understand how it might
be too difficult to devise a mechanism to segregate returns on capital when
the GILTI and FDII rules do exactly that. On the other hand, it is entirely
conceivable that Congress was pressured by influential constituents to discard
the proposed employment tax reforms. The typical top earner derives the
lion’s share of their income as an active owner in a business.203 The House
measure would have eliminated their ability to disguise their high tax labor
income as low tax business profits. Whatever the reason for the omission,
now that the law includes a way to segregate returns on capital, it would seem
to be possible to use that same procedure to determine the amount of labor
income that should be included in the employment tax base for a selfemployed individual. If incorporated into the employment tax rules, such a
change would address the most problematic feature of the system: the absence
of a mandatory procedure to objectively determine a self-employed
individual’s labor income.204

to determine their return on capital from an investment in an active business.”).
200. Sheppard, supra note 149, at 1481.
201. Foster, supra note 167 (quoting Robert K. Keatinge).
202. Susswein, supra note 152, at 497.
203. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
204. A more complete and comprehensive set of reforms would include an elimination of the
deduction for qualified business income. Few believe it serves any worthwhile policy objective. E.g.,
Sullivan, supra note 152, at 23. At the very least, the provision should be restructured so that it targets
returns on capital in a more surgical way.
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V. A GILTI INSPIRED ALTERNATIVE
The employment tax provisions incorporated into the 2017 Tax Act as
introduced in the House provide a useful framework for potential reforms.
Those rules addressed situations where the taxpayer is an owner in a
passthrough firm.205 Under those rules, if the taxpayer was a material
participant in a service firm, the taxpayer’s employment tax base would
include their entire share of the firm’s active business income, in addition to
any payments they received for their work. Meanwhile, if the taxpayer was a
material participant in a non-service firm, the taxpayer’s employment tax base
would include 70% of those amounts (i.e., their profit share plus any
compensation for work). However, the taxpayer had the option to determine
their labor income by assuming that the firm earned a specified rate of return
on the adjusted basis in the capital assets used in the business. The original
bill assumed that the rate of return is AFR+7%. However, in view of the
procedure incorporated into the GILTI rules, the rate would be 10% under this
proposal.206
Like the House bill, this proposal uses the material participation standard
to distinguish individuals whose employment tax base should include a
portion of their share of a firm’s business profits. The test is a familiar and
well-developed one that distinguishes individuals who actively work in a firm
from those who do not.207 Under the House bill, the amount of a taxpayer’s
labor income was based on the combination of the taxpayer’s profit share and
payments for their work.208 However, their employment tax base would never
be less than the payments they received for their work.209 Thus, assume
someone was an active owner in a non-service firm. If they received 40% in
wages and 60% as a profit share allocation, their employment tax base would
be 40%, even though the default rule would otherwise treat only 70% as labor
income.210 This is a sensible limitation that is also adopted by this proposal.
205. See supra notes 159–163 and accompanying text.
206. See I.R.C. § 915A (2018). There is considerable debate about the proper method for computing
an appropriate rate of return on capital assets used in a business. See generally Reynolds & Neubig,
supra note 30, at 7. The method utilized here is one of many possible alternatives. But it is not
necessarily superior to the other options. The sole advantage for using it here is that it would be
consistent with the procedure incorporated into the GILTI and FDII rules.
207. See Michael L. Schler, Reflections on the Pending Tax Cuts and Jobs Acts, 157 TAX NOTES
1731, 1734–35 (Dec.18, 2017).
208. See JCT REPORT ON H.R. 1, supra note 158, at 17.
209. Id. at 22.
210. If the firm was an S corporation, the entire 40% would be subject to tax under FICA. If the
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The GILTI rules recognize that any investment in business property could
be financed with either equity, debt, or a combination of the two. As such,
any investor would be entitled to enjoy the returns on such an investment only
after any interest on such debt has been paid. Accordingly, in order to
properly measure the return on the equity invested in such business property,
the statute reduces the assumed 10% return by the firm’s net interest
expense.211 A similar adjustment for interest expense would be in order for
purposes of computing the employment tax base under this proposal. Because
the adjustment reduces the amount of income attributable to a return on
capital, it would translate into a larger amount of labor income.
Within the GILTI regime, the fixed rate of return applies to a base
generally consisting of the adjusted tax basis of tangible business property
other than land.212 However, if the objective is to approximate the income that
is attributable to capital employed in a business, land should be part of this
base.213 An investment in land is no less a factor of production than is other
property used in a business. The GILTI rules were criticized for excluding
land from the asset base.214
In many cases, the depreciated basis of business property will reflect
overly generous allowances that may grossly overstate the actual wear and
tear sustained. For instance, the 2017 Tax Act introduced a temporary rule
permitting taxpayers to claim a deduction equal to 100% of the cost of certain
property, up from 50% of the cost.215 That deduction would cause the
depreciated basis of the property to fall to zero, which would translate into
zero income attributable to that particular capital investment. That clearly
would not correspond to reality. These problems do not arise under the GILTI
rules because they rely on an alternative depreciation system to determine the
tax basis of property solely for purposes of computing the return on a firm’s
capital investments.216 Because that system is built around the straight-line
method of depreciation, it eliminates these distortions.217 The proposal being
offered here would rely on the same system to determine the adjusted tax basis
firm was an LLC, the entire 40% would be subject to tax under SECA.
211. I.R.C. § 951A(b)(2)(B) (2018).
212. I.R.C. § 951A(d).
213. Cf. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(2). It might be appropriate to also include certain intangible assets whose
cost is subject to amortization. See id. § 197.
214. Schler, supra note 207, at 1755.
215. I.R.C. § 179.
216. I.R.C. § 951A(d)(3).
217. Id. § 168(g).
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of property used in a business.
Although the original House bill provides a useful framework, it has one
principal shortcoming. It does not address the opportunities for someone to
reduce their employment tax liability when they operate through a
corporation. There is already a concern that the C corporation is now more
attractive than a passthrough entity for at least some taxpayers.218 The
changes proposed here will make the C corporation more attractive to an even
greater number of self-employed individuals, who can easily reclassify their
firms by simply checking a box on a form.219 Firms that are C corporations
offer their owners two viable ways to minimize their overall tax liabilities.
The owners can decline to access the earnings in any form, or they can choose
to access the earnings as a dividend. Both strategies are attractive options
under current law, and either one would prevent the labor income of an active
owner from appearing in their employment tax base.220 There have been
several pleas to increase the corporate tax from the level set by the 2017 Tax
Act. President Biden has proposed increasing it to 28%.221 Depending on the
size of an increase, such a change could entirely prevent the C corporation
from offering any tax savings opportunities to a self-employed person.
However, absent an increase in the corporate tax, policymakers might be
forced to consider potential ways to address the risk of wholesale employment
tax avoidance through a C corporation.
One option would be a mandatory rule that would treat a portion of the
income of a closely held C corporation as the labor income of its active
owners. The tax code already contains a set of rules targeted at taxpayers who
use the C corporation to avoid tax on investment income.222 Because only
closely held firms have an incentive to use a C corporation for this purpose,
the rule only applies when the firm has five or fewer individuals who own
over half the stock in the firm for the last six months of the year.223 Firms
with the same concentration of ownership are also the most likely to be used
to disguise the labor income of their owners. An anti-abuse rule targeted at
this class of firms might require the firm and the active owners to be taxed as
218. See supra note 71.
219. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (2019).
220. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
221. Fact Sheet: The American Jobs Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-americanjobs-plan/.
222. I.R.C. §§ 541–547 (2018).
223. Id. § 542(a)(2).
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if the firm compensated the owner for their work.224 The amount of this
constructive payment could be determined in the same way that this proposal
would require the owners in passthrough firms to determine the amount of
labor income derived through such a firm. This author has described a
variation of this idea elsewhere.225 However, there may be other options to
address the tax avoidance opportunities that the C corporation may offer. The
most important thing for policymakers to understand is that employment tax
avoidance will merely take a different form if the government does not address
the full range of strategies that are available to practice it.
Putting aside the opportunities to use a C corporation to avoid
employment tax, there is at least one loophole that will remain: the taxation
of so-called carried interests. The term refers to the profit shares allocated to
the managers of private equity funds. The typical fund is classified as a
partnership for tax purposes. As compensation for their work, the fund
managers receive a profits interest in the firm. That gives them a stake in the
success of the fund, while also causing them to be partners in the firm. Under
current rules, the manager is not taxed on receipt of the interest.226 Moreover,
because the fund’s profits take the form of investment returns, any payment a
manger ultimately receives will be treated as such.227 Under current rules,
such items of income are excluded from the SECA tax base.228 The plan being
offered here does not change that, which makes sense for the vast majority of
business ventures outside the private equity context. Therefore, even under
this plan, carried interests will remain excluded from the employment tax base
until Congress addresses carried interests with more targeted legislation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The mere existence of tax reduction opportunities jeopardizes the
integrity of the employment tax base. Equally important, the tax system

224. This is not unlike the constructive dividend that the tax code employs to address the tax
avoidance opportunities available through a controlled foreign corporation. See id. § 951(a).
225. See Richard Winchester, Working for Free: It Ought to be Against the (Tax) Law, 76 MISS.
L.J. 227 (2006).
226. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2008) (discussing relevant legal authorities).
227. I.R.C. § 702(b) (2018).
228. Id. § 1402(a); see also Chris Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund
Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1111–12 (2008)
(estimating the magnitude of the tax savings).
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cannot function in a fair and equitable way when individuals can control their
tax liability. Simply put, individuals who are in materially similar situations
will pay vastly different amounts in tax. That alone offends basic notions of
equity. However, it is also difficult for the interests of fairness and equity to
be served when the system permits an individual to dictate the rules they will
observe and how they will observe them. When such options are available,
tax outcomes will partly reflect how successfully someone has employed
strategic measures to artificially reduce their tax liability.
The employment tax system is way overdue for reform. The 2017 Tax
Act did nothing to improve the situation, and it may have increased the
incentives for taxpayers to exploit the system’s shortcomings. However, the
GILTI rules may offer policymakers a framework for real and lasting reform.

948

